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Chancellor Schmidt's Visits ' to 
Washington (May 20-23, 1981) 








Mrhe people of our 
country want peace. And 
the people of our country 
know that we can only 
guarantee peace and 
security as a partner in the 
Western Alliance .. M 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 
an interview with Radio Hesse, May 24, 1981 
Chancellor and President before the fireplace in the White House. 
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During the official visit of Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic 
of Germany to the United States from 
May 20-23, 1981, President Reagan 
and the Federal Chancellor held detailed 
talks on a wide range of political and 
economic questions. They noted with 
satisfaction that they share a common 
assessment of the international situa-
tion and its implications for the Western 
Alliance. They agreed that their two 
countries have a common destiny 
founded on joint security interests and 
firmly rooted in their shared values of 
liberty, a democratic way of life, self-
determination and belief in the inalien-
able rights of man. 
They regard the reliable and proven 
U.S.-Garman partnership as an essen-
tial factor in international stability and 
Western security based on the North 
Atlantic Alliance. They agreed that 
substantive and effective consultations 
are a mainstay of the relations between 
Western Europe and the United States. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor welcomed and reaffirmed the results 
of the recent NATO Ministerial meetings 
in Rome and Brussels as renewed proof 
of the political strength of the Alliance 
and the continuity of Alliance policy. 
They stressed the determination of Alli-
ance members to take the necessary 
steps to work with their NATO partners 
to strengthen the Western defense 
posture and to address adverse trends 
due to the Soviet military buildup. 
Together with deterrence and defense, 
arms control and disarmament are inte-
gral parts of Alliance security policy. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor affirmed in this connection their 
resolve to implement both elements of 
the NATO decision of December 1979 
and to give equal weight to both 
elements. The Federal Chancellor 
welcomed the U.S. decision to begin 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
the limitation of theater nuclear 
weapons within the SALT framework by 
the end of this year. He also welcomed 
the fact that the U.S. Secretary of State 
has initiated preparatory discussions on 
TNF with the Soviet Union, looking 
toward an agreement to begin formal 
negotiations. The President and the 
Federal Chancellor agreed that TNF 
modernization is essential for Alliance 
security and as a basis for parallel nego-
tiations leading to concrete results on 
limitations of theater nuclear forces. 
They further agreed that the preparatory 
studies called for in the Rome commu-
nique should be undertaken as matters 
of immediate priority by the relevant 
NATO bodies. 
. The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor assessed very favorably the close 
cooperation between the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany and the Three Powers in 
• matters relating to Berlin and Germany 
as a whole. The Federal Chancellor 
thanked the President for his reaffirma-
tion of the pledge that the United States 
will continue to guarantee the security 
and viability of Berlin. They agreed that 
the maintenance of the calm situation in 
and around Berlin is of crucial signifi-
cance for European security and stabil-
ity .. 
The European Community plays an 
important part in maintaining interna-
tional political and economic stability. 
The U.S. will continue to support the 
process of European unification. 
Both sides noted that a serious interna-
tional situation has been created by 
Soviet expansionism and armaments 
efforts. To meet this challenge and to 
secure peace, they are determined to 
respond with firmness and to maintain a 
dialogue with the Soviet Union. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor agreed that it is important for the 
stabilization of East-West relations that 
the current CSCE Review Conference in 
Madrid agree on a balanced substantive 
concluding document which includes 
enhanced respect for human rights, 
increased human contacts, a freer flow 
of information, and cooperation among 
and security for all of the participants. In 
this regard, and as part of such a 
balanced result, the President and the 
Chancellor favor agreement on a precise 
mandate for a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe, providing for the appli-
cation of militarily significant, binding 
and verifiable confidence-building 
measures covering all of the continent of 
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
Poland must be allowed to solve its 
problems peacefully and without exter-
nal interference. The President and the 
Federal Chancellor reaffirmed unequivo-
cally their view that any external inter-
vention would have the gravest conse-
quences for international relations and 
would fundamentally change the entire 
international situation. 
Genuine nonalignment of the states of 
the developing world is an important 
stabilizing factor in international rela-
tions. The Chancellor and the President 
support the independence and the right 
of self-determination of the states of the 
developing world. They will, in concert 
with their Allies and the countries 
affected, oppose any attempts, direct or 
indirect, by the Soviet Union to under-
mine the independence and stability of 
these states. They confirmed their 
willingness to continue their coopera-. 
tion with these states on the basis of 
equal partnership and to continue their 
support of their economic development. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor reaffirmed their view that the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan is unaccept-
able. They demanded the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan and 
respect for that country's right to return 
to independence and non-alignment. 
The destabilizing effects which the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has 
on the entire region must be countered. 
Both sides stressed the importance of 
broad-based cooperation with the 
states of the Gulf region. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor agreed that the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the latter 
within the framework of European politi-
cal cooperation, should continue the 
search for a comprehensive, just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. Their 
efforts should continue to be comple-
mentary and build upon what has been 
achieved so far. 
Both sides reaffirmed the determination 
to strengthen further the open system of 
world trade and to oppose pressure for 
protectionist measures. 
E 
They stressed the vital importance for 
political and economic stability of further 
energy conservation and diversification 
measures to reduce the high degree of 
dependence on oil. The pressing energy 
problems can only be mastered on the 
basis of world-wide cooperative efforts 
that strengthen Western energy secu-
rity and reduce the vulnerability of the 
West to potential supply cutoffs from 
any source. The supply problems of the 
developing countries require particular 
attention. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-' 
lor agreed on the need in framing their 
economic' policies to give high priority to' 
the fight against inflation and to the· 
creation of improved conditions for 
renewed economic growth and 
increased productivity. Both sides 
In the Nato forest 
stressed the need for close coordination 
of economic policies among the indus-
trial countries. 
Both sides stressed the need for a close 
and comprehensive exchange of views 
on the U.N. Conference on the Law of the 
Sea while the U.S. Government reviews 
its position. 
The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor noted that their talks once more 
demonstrated the friendly and trusting 
relationship that has linked their two 
countries for over 30 years. They 
welcomed all efforts which serve to 
broaden mutual contacts and underlined 
the responsibility of the coming genera-
tion for maintaining and developing 
German-American friendship. 






Remarks of the President and of 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the 
Federal Republic of Germany at 
Arrival Ceremony on the South 
Lawn of the White House, May 21, 
1981 
THE PRESIDENT: Chancellor 
Schmidt, one of the warmest greetings 
that Americans can offer in welcoming a 
guest Into their midst is to say, "Make 
yourself at home." On behalf of our 
fellow citizens, Nancy and I hope that 
you and Mrs. Schmidt will make your-
selves at home during your visit to the 
United States. 
We remember with great pleasure how 
welcome and at home you made us feel 
on our visit to Germany In 1978. As you 
·know, millions of German Immigrants 
over the years have made America their 
home. With strong hands and good 
hearts, these Industrious people helped 
build a strong and good America. But as 
proud as they were of this country, they 
didn't forget their German heritage. They 
named towns In the New World after 
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those In the Old. The Federal Republic of 
Germany has just one Bremen. The 
Federal Republic has one but we have 
Bremens In Indiana, In Georgia, and 
Ohio. And our states are dotted with 
Hamburgs and Berlins.ln honor of Baron 
Von Steuben, the Prussian officer who 
aided our revolution, we have cities and 
towns In a number of states named after 
him. But I hope you'll forgive us: over the 
years, we've sort of anglicized the 
pronunciation. We call them now Steu-
bens and Steubenvilles. And the list 
goes on from Heidelberg, Mississippi, to 
Stuggart, Arkansas. But the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United 
States of America share more than a 
common background and a well-esta-
blished friendship. 
We share values about the importance 
of liberty. This year marks the 20th 
anniversary of the Berlin Wall, a border 
of brutality that assaults the human 
spirit and the civilized mind. On one side 
of the wall, people live in dignity and 
democracy. On the other side, in domin-
ation and defeat. We of the United 
States are aware of this relentless pres-
sure on the Federal Republic and its 
citizens. And we admire you for your 
courage in the face of such grim reali-
ties. 
The Federal Republic is perched on the 
cliff of freedom that overlooks Soviet 
dependents to the East. While the domi-
nated peoples in these lands cannot 
enjoy your liberties, they can look at your 
example and hope. 
The United States is proud to stand 
beside you as your beacon shines 
brightly from that cliff of freedom. We 
both recognize the challenges posed to 
our security by those who do not share 
our beliefs and our objectives. And 
together, we will act to counter those 
dangers. 
The United States will work in partner-
ship with you and with our other Euro-
pean allies to bolster NATO and to offset 
the disturbing build-up of Soviet military 
forces. At the same time, we will work 
toward meaningful negotiations to limit 
those very weapons. 
Mr. Chancellor, under your thoughtful 
and responsible leadership, the Federal 
Republic has sought to ease tensions in 
a world taut and quivering with the 
strains of Instability-not only between 
East and West but between North and 
South. And we're aware of the Federal 
Republic's other contributions as well. 
Americans remember that when the 
United States sought support In freeing 
American prisoners In Iran, the Federal 
Republic stood firmly by us and we thank 
you for that support. 
Although the Federal Republic, like the 
United States, is not immune to econ-
omic difficulties, the Communist coun-
tries cannot help but compare your well-
being with their own shortages and 
hardships. 
Our economic policies should be as 
closely allied as our defense policies; 
for, in the end, our military capabilities 
are dependent on the strengths of our 
economies. Sound fiscal management 
was the hallmark of the Federal Repu-
blic's economic miracle and we In the 
United States Intend to import some of 
that responsibility to gain control of our 
own economy. 
Chancellor Schmidt, I began these 
remarks speaking of German immi-
grants who came to America. Let me 
mention one immigrant In particular-
Johann Augustus Roebling, the man 
who built the Brooklyn Bridge, which at 
its opening in 1883, was called the 
eighth wonder of the world. Well, Mr. 
Roebling spanned more than the East 
River with his accomplishment. He 
spanned two countries and two peoples. 
The discussions we have today will 
span our common goals and bridge our 
joint concerns. They will set the scene 
for the closest possible consultations in 
the future. 
We have come to rely on one another in 
times of calm and in times of crisis. And 
that certainly is the basis of a true friend 
partnership. It is in that spirit that I look 
forward to the important talks ahead. 
And again, "Herzlich Wil/kommen." 
CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT: Mr. 
President, Mrs. Reagan, ladies and 
gentlemen, thank you very much, Mr. 
President, for your cordial reception and 
your most friendly words of welcome. 
This is not the first time I've been here, 
but on each occasion I'm impressed by 
the authority and dignity which radiates 
from this seat of government of the 
mighty United States of America. I am 
very glad to have this opportunity for an 
exchange of views with you, Mr. Presi-
dent, on major issues which both of us 
have much on our minds. 
I cannot tell you how happy I am to know 
that you have recovered so well from the 
treacherous attempt on your life on the 
30th of March. We In Germany have 
· followed your rapid progress with much 
emotion, and with a great sense of relief. 
My visit to Washington is taking place 
against the background of a serious 
international situation. 
At the beginning of the 80s, we are 
confronted with a whole range of prob-
lems and challenges. I need only 
mention excessive Soviet arms build-
up, the challenge toward the community 
of nations resulting from the continuing 
Soviet Intervention In Afghanistan, the 
threat to the non-alignment of the Third 
World countries, stemming from unre-
solved political conflicts, and as a result 
of East-West conflicts being transferred 
to their part of the world. And I need only 
mention also the impact of the oil price 
explosion on the whole world economy. 
The Western democracies will be able to 
cope with these challenges if they show 
their determination, if they take joint 
action, and if they let themselves be 
guided by the principles of consistency, 
predictability and reliability. 
Three weeks ago In Rome, our alliance 
gave a clear signal for the continuity of 
our common policies. I regarded this as 
a proof of the alliance's political 
strength. And as I said In the German 
Parliament two weeks ago, I also regard 
it as a success for your new administra-
tion here In Washington, D. C. 
German-American partnership is today 
again manifest in the wide-ranging 
consultations between you, Mr. Presi-
dent, and the German head of govern-
ment. Good and reliable relations 
between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States of 
America are, in my view, a major factor 
for the security of the West and for Inter-
national stability. 
I am confident that this visit will help us 
to fulfill our common responsibilities. 







Address by Helmut Schmidt, Chan-
cellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, at the National Press 
Club, Washington, 22 May 1981 
It is a pleasure to be your guest speaker 
again and I am most grateful for your 
Invitation. 
Some people do not find the world-wide 
habit of connecting eating with speech 
making very recommendable. I dis-
agree-the better the meal, the better 
the speech. You will judge both by my 
performance. 
As for my visit to Washington, I attach 
. special importance to it. As some of you 
may remember, I have met Mr. Reagan 
several times, but this Is my first meeting 
with him in his capacity as President, 
and also with the new Administration. I 
was happy to see President Reagan fully 
recovered and in his usual good humour. 
Over the past twelve months there has 
been a growing realization that the eigh-
ties will confront us all with major prob-
lems and challenges. 
Some developments in particular have 
been a source of destabilization. The 
Soviet Union, by its arms build-up, par-
ticularly in the fields of medium range 
nuclear weapons and naval forces, has . 
upset the military balance. And with its 
intervention in Afghanistan it has 
provoked the non-aligned and espe-
cially the Muslim countries. 
Third World independence and non-
alignment are in jeopardy as a result of 
unresolved political conflicts and 
through the danger of the East-West 
confrontation being transferred to those 
countries. 
The second oil price explosion, which 
has made the price shoot up by 170 per 
cent since 1978, has affected all coun-
tries-in the West, In the East, but above 
all the developing countries. In many 
parts of the world it has become a threat 
to social and political stability. 
If the Western democracies are to be 
able to cope with these problems they 
must stand firm, they must show their 
determination, and they must co-oper-
ate with one another. The dangers will 
have to be met with joint and resolute 
action. 
In this situation the close relationship 
between the Federal Republic and the 
United States, which Is based on a deep 
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feeling of mutual trust, assumes a fresh · 
significance. President Reagan and his 
Administration know that they can rely 
on our continuous co-operation. 
The Federal Republic of Germany 
belongs to the West. Only our member-
ship of the Western Alliance can guar-
antee our security, our freedom, and our 
ability to act. We are and will remain a 
dependable partner of the United 
States. We regard co-operation with the 
United States as a cornerstone of stabil-
ity in a world of many Instabilities. 
My talks in Washington are the continu-
ation of an intensive process of consul-
tations which got under way with meet-
lng·s between our foreign and defense 
. and finance ministers. They follow as 
well the ministerial meeting of the Atlan-
tic Alliance In Rome, where all member 
countries confirmed the continuity of the 
policies of our Alliance: Firmness In 
maintaining the military balance, deter-
mination In the pursuit of arms control. 
Stabilizing East-West relations · and 
maintaining peace depend on several 
requirements. 
The first requirement is military balance. 
Particularly in the case of theatre 
nuclear forces the balance has been 
upset-both quantitatively and qualita-
tively-by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and 
Backfire bombers. It is true that in this 
field, as in the field of conventional 
weapons, there has always been Soviet 
superiority, but it was offset by the U.S. 
superiority in intercontinental strategic 
systems. Today the West has no 
adequate counterbalance to the Soviet 
Union's new and rapidly growing 
medium-range nuclear capability. On a 
number of occasions since 1977 I have 
publicly warned of the dangers of this 
situation. 
Out of these considerations the Atlantic 
Alliance in December 1979 took the 
two-track decision, in which, together 
with the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, my Government played 
a considerable part from the very begin-
ning. This decision reflects the convic-
tion of all members of the Alliance that 
the mounting Soviet medium range 
nuclear potential must be countered by 
modernizing the corresponding Alliance 
capabilities. 
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However, that necessary decision to 
modernize was coupled with an offer to 
the Soviet Union of parallel negotiations 
on the limitation of these weapons. The 
aim is to prevent an arms race which 
would create new dangers without 
giving either side additional security. 
Public opinion in European countries 
expects every possible step to be taken 
to stop the uncontrolled growth of 
nuclear weaponry, the dangers of which, 
if only for geographical reasons, are very 
real to us In the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The deployment of additional 
theatre nuclear forces in a densely 
populated country, roughly comparable 
to the area between Boston and Wash-
Ington, was not a decision to be taken 
lightly . 
I therefore see it as one of the most 
Important results of the meeting of Allied 
Foreign Ministers In Rome that the Alli-
ance welcomed the Intention of the 
United States to begin negotiations with 
the Soviet Union on medium-range 
nuclear weapons before the end of this 
year. 
For many years it has been my 
belief-and I was saying this when I was 
Defense Minister and have even written 
a book on the subject (also published in 
your country)-that an approximate 
balance of forces is and will remain an 
important factor in maintaining peace. 
This means we must neither accept a 
position of weakness nor maintain aspi-
rations to military superiority. It follows 
that the West must be resolved not to 
allow any actual shift in the balance of 
forces in favour of the Soviet Union. 
The Federal Republic of Germany has 
always subscribed to the Alliance's 
efforts to prevent any such shift.ln times 
when other members of the Alliance felt 
that they had to give their defense 
contributions a lower priority rating, the 
German Armed Forces were continu-
ously and effectively modernized and 
their combat efficiency and equipment 
continuously Improved. 
The contribution of the German Armed 
Forces-and as you know we have not 
abandoned conscription-is today of 
central importance for Europe's military 
security. We intend to continue these 
efforts and to do everything in our power 
to strengthen the Alliance's defense 
capability. 
The Federal Republic of Germany contri-
butes to the Alliance 500,000 well-
trained and well-equipped servicemen, 
who make up 50 per cent of the Alli-
ance's conventional forces. In an 
emergency this number would be raised 
in a very short time to 1.2 million men. 
But lasting peace cannot be built on a 
military balance only. To ensure peace 
the upkeep of a military balance must be 
accompanied by a dialogue with the 
other side. It is precisely in times of 
crisis that the dialogue with the Soviet 
Union should not be cut short. 
Last summer I visited Moscow and partly 
as result of my discussions with the 
Soviet leaders it was possible for initial 
talks between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on medium-range nuclear 
weapons to commence in the fall. 
President Brezhnev will probably be 
visiting Bonn this year. We see this as 
another opportunity to make our position 
clear at the highest level about various 
aspects of Soviet policy that are causing 
us concern, and to explore ways and 
means of settling current problems. We 
shall do this from positions agreed upon 
within the Alliance. It is at times when 
relations are difficult that such dialogue 
is necessary. 
Another requirement for stabilizing the 
international situation and maintaining 
peace is restraint In political actions. In 
this respect I am thinking of Poland in 
particular. The Polish people must be left 
free to resolve their own problems in 
. peace. 'Any aggravation of the situation 
from outside, whether from the East or 
the West, would be dangerous. Only if a 
climate of co-operation Is preserved in 
Europe will we In the West be able to 
continue to help the Poles overcome 
their tremendous economic difficulties. 
The call for restraint in political action is 
nowhere compatible with any recourse 
to force, or the support of force, with a 
policy of faits accomplis, and with 
attempts to secure unilateral advan-
tages. The French President and I 
issued a joint statement as early as 5 
February 1980 in which we condemned 
the Soviet Intervention In Afghanistan. 
We said that detente would not survive 
another blow of the same kind. We 
endorsed that view exactly twelve 
months later, on 5 February of this year. 
The Rome communique of the North 
Atlantic Alliance described the Soviet 
Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan 
as a particularly flagrant example of 
violation of the principles of restraint and 
responsibility in international affairs. It 
says that the occupation remains and 
will remain totally unacceptable to the 
allies and to world opinion. 
The call for restraint must also lead to a 
search for political solutions in the 
Middle East. The Camp David Agree-
ment was a step In that direction. 
Just recently I visited Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, a region of 
great International importance. The 
leaders of those countries strongly 
urged early steps towards a solution of 
the Middle East conflict. They particu-
larly fear that the smouldering Israeli-
Arab crisis could offer the Soviet Union 
further opportunities for interference in 
the region. 
It is my sincere hope that Israelis and 
Arabs will one day be able to live side by 
side under a comprehensive and equi-
table peace settlement. 
The Arab leaders and I share the view 
that the more the West alienates the 
Palestinians, the more will they be 
drawn towards the Soviet Union. While 
in Riyadh I publicly stated the Federal 
Government's position on the PLO and 
would like to repeat it here, word for 
word: 
"Our German attitude to the PLO will be 
determined by the position which the 
PLO adopts with regard to the right-to 
which the State of Israel, too, is 
entitled-to live within secure and recog-
nized frontiers." 
The last requirement I want to mention 
concerns the common responsibility of 
nations in solving major world problems. 
To us the fight against hunger and 
distress and the efforts to promote the 
economic development of the disadvan-
taged regions of the world are not only a 
At the Department of State, Washington, May 21, 1981, after a luncheon given by the 
U.S. Secretary of State in honour of the Chancellor. From I. to r.: Secretary of State 
Alexander M. Haig, Mrs. Hannelore Schmidt, Mrs. Patricia F. Haig and Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt. I 
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duty to humanity. These efforts are at 
the same time an essential means of 
safeguarding peace in the long term. 
i 
These are universal tasks. No country 
can shirk this common responsibil-
ity-neither the developing countries 
themselves nor the state-trading coun-
tries of Eastern Europe,' nor the oil pro-
ducers, nor the big Industrial countries. 
The Soviet Union, being a large Indus-
trial country, will not be able to stand on 
the sidelines forever. On the contrary, it, 
too, will have to bear its share of the 
responsibility for the world economy. 
i 
It is the oil-importing developing coun-
tries that have been worst hit by the 
world economic structural crisis. Efforts 
to resolve these problems will therefore 
have to focus on energy. It will also be 
Important to control population growth, a 
problem which cannot be evaded. 
Official aid from the industrial countries 
and private investment will still be 
necessary, as well as the transfer of 
technology, which is the most effective 
instrument. All these problems are to be 
discussed at the North-South summit 
meeting scheduled to take place in 
Mexico. 
Only through their combined efforts can 
Europe and America face up to these 
great challenges of the eighties. I am 
convinced that the German-American 
partnership will make a valuable contrib-
ution to those efforts. 
I am now ready to listen to your ques-






Remarks of the U.S. President 
and of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
at departure ceremony 
-The Rose Garden-
8 
THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and 
gentlemen of the press, the time has 
come for me to say goodbye to our visi-
tor here. I just want to tell you that we 
have had fine meetings and we have an 
understanding that there will be full 
consultation and co-operation between 
us as there properly should be between 
friends and allies. 
We have been in agreement on the 
various issues that confront us ranging 
from the matters of the problems In East-
ern Europe-Poland, the theatre nuclear 
forces and the fact that we are going 
forward with arms limitation talks, also, 
with the Warsaw Pact and with the 
Soviet Union. All of these things and all 
of these problems were discussed and I 
think we've established a cordial rela-
tionship and a friendship that bodes very 
well for the future and for the West. 
Mr. Chancellor, it's been a great plea-
sure to have you here and Mrs. Schmidt 
here and we hope that there will be 
repeated visits and exchanges. 
CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT: 
Thank you very much, sir. Mr. President, 
ladies and gentlemen, I would like to 
agree with every line that the President 
just relayed to you. The amount of 
mutual understanding you can measure 
by the secret which I'm going to disclose 
right now. 
The President had a lengthy speech-a 
lengthy paper prepared for him by the 
White House staff-and I was without any 
such paper. And I said, "This is unfair." 
And he dropped it immediately. So, you 
see, we really did not only agree on such 
more peripheral issues but we did agree 
on the substance of policies whether it 
is, as the President said, vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union and their allies, whether it 
is in regard to such specific problems as 
Eastern Europe right now or Afghanistan 
or the Gulf or the Middle East or Africa or 
Latin America, Central America or 
whether it is in the other fields in which 
we have mutual interests and shall 
co-operate in the future, I would like, Mr. 
President, also on behalf of my delega-
tion and also on behalf of my wife, to 
thank you personally, to thank the Vice 
President, to thank the Secretary of 
State; also the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the other 
Cabinet members-to thank all of the 
hosts in Washington for the warm and 
cordial welcome not only but also 
regarding the free uninhibited exchange 
of views. 
I'm not so sure, it's about my 45th or 
46th or 47th visit to the United States. It 
was the fourth time that I had the privi-
lege of meeting you, Mr. President, the 
first time in your new capacity as the 
head of state and head of government of 
the most important nation of the world, 
the greatest nation. 
I, to some degree, feel at home in the 
United States and at home In Washing-
ton, D. C. I felt very much at home these 
two days and I will get back to my 
people, get back to my Parliament, will 
report to the German Parliament Tues-
day next week on how much we agreed 
on very difficult matters in worldwide 
politics. 
It is due to my lack of a text, ladies and 
gentlemen, and I apologize, Mr. Presi-
dent, for speaking so long; but what 1 
really want to project towards the ladies 
and gentlemen of the press is how 
deeply satisfied I am about this visit. 







Government Statement on ttie 
Chancellor's Visits to Washington, 
Paris. 
Delivered by Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt to the Bundestag in Bonn, 
May 26, 1981. 
In my policy statement of 24 November 
1980 I mentioned the basic outlines of 
this Government's foreign policy, a 
policy of reliable partnership; a policy 
that is calculable for everyone and 
based on continuity. 
Today I wish to report on the develop-
ment of relations with several of our 
principal partners in the West, develop-
ments which, let me say this straight 
away, we can all be very satisfied with 
and which strengthen our confidence in 
our friends and our courage to face the 
future. 
In the past few days I have met two 
statesmen who have only recently taken 
over the leadership of two of our most 
important partners: Mr. Ronald Reagan, 
President of the United States of Ameri-
ca, who came to power in January, and 
M. Fran~ois Mitterrand, the French 
President, who assumed office last 
Thursday. 
Although I had met both of them previ-
ously I very much welcomed the oppor-
tunity to have detailed discussions with 
them in Washington and Paris in their 
new functions. Both of them provided a 
very friendly atmosphere for my visits 
and we were able to lay the foundations 
for trustful co-operation. 
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Prior to my visit to Washington and Paris 
I had talks with the British Prime Minis-
ter, Mrs. Thatcher, at her country resi- . 
dence, Chequers, on 11 and 12 May. 
Those talks were very friendly and frank, 
both sides being particularly aware that 
we are and will remain dependent upon 
one another In Europe and in the 
conduct of our international policies. 
German-British accord on world issues 
has been confirmed. Chequers was not 
'the place, however, nor was the time 
right, for working out arrangements 
concerning Community problems. But 
we expressed the hope that the 
Commission In Brussels will fulfil its 
mandate in time and that it will be poss-
ible to find satisfactory solutions to the 
problems to be dealt with in the second 
half of the year, especially the problem of 
the Community budget and the related 
issue of the structure of the agricultural 
policy. 
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The first comment I should like to make 
on my visit to Washington is that to my 
great pleasure the President of the 
United States'of America has recovered 
in an amazingly short time from the 
wounds he sustained in the attempt 
upon his life. I had two intensive discus-
sions with the President. Moreover, he 
insisted on being our host at dinner in 
the White House with some excellent 
entertainment: 
I also had talks with the Vice-President, 
Mr. Bush, the Secretary of State, Mr. 
Haig, the Secretary of Defence, Mr. 
Weinberger, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, Mr. Regan, and the President's 
chief economic adviser, Professor Wei-
denbaum. I also met the Senate majority 
leader, Senator Baker, as well as 
members of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of 
Representatives for extensive talks. In 
addition to these talks with members of 
the Administration and of Congress I 
again had meetings with the President 
of the AFUCIO, Mr. Kirkland, and with 
representatives of the Conference of 
Presidents of Major Jewish Organiza-
tions. 1 
Just before I left for America it was 
announced that Arthur Burns had been 
nominated as U.S. Ambassador to Bonn. 
That was a fine prelude to my talks with 
the new American Administration. As an 
eminent economist and finance expert, 
Dr. Burns is held in the highest esteem, 
and not only in his own country. We are 
therefore pleased that the post of Amer-
ican Ambassador, which is so important 
for the continuous flow of information 
and views between our two Govern-
ments, will soon be occupied again. 
My visit to Washington was very oppor-
tune. Considering the critical develop-
ments in East-West relations, the aggra-
vation or continuation of numerous 
crises in the Third World, and the uncer-
tainty as to the further development of 
the world economy, consultations with 
the heads of State or Government of 
partner countries are today more import-
ant than ever. 
My talks with President Reagan bene-
fited considerably from the fact that they 
followed on from a number of recent 
German-American and European-
American contacts. We were able to 
proceed in particular on the basis of the 
agreed statement on the talks between 
Foreign Minister Genscher and Secre-
tary Haig (9 March 1981) as well as the 
important communiques issued after the 
meetings of the NATO Council in Rome 
(5 May 1981) and the Defence Planning 
Committee in Brussels (12/13 May 
1981 ). 
Both the Americans and we were keen 
to hold these high-level and intensive 
discussions at this particular time 
because final decisions have not yet 
been taken on several aspects of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Effective Consultations 
In all of the talks it became clear that the 
new Administration is very serious about 
what it has described from the outset as 
the mainstay of its foreign policy: effec-
tive consultations with its Atlantic part-
ners. 
Such an exchange of views among 
friends requires a particular atmos-
phere. I can note with satisfaction that 
the talks with President Reagan were 
marked by a great willingness for mutual 
understanding and trust. I was 
impressed by the calmness, the clear-
thinking manner and the great sense of 
responsibility with which the President 
made his frequently very grave remarks. 
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This basic atmosphere surrounding our 
talks made it easy to achieve agreement 
on a wide range of common problems. 
This is clearly reflected in the joint state-
ment on my visit which you have all been 
given. This statement, which documents 
the results of our talks, is marked by the 
. continuity of Alliance policy. It confirms 
the broad-based consensus already 
achieved among all the allies and devel-
ops it further. 
A key topic of my negotiations in Wash-
ington was the situation in Western 
Europe. We talked about the economic 
and political importance of the European 
Community and about the situation in 
individual States. I gave the President 
my assessment of what several 
newspapers have in gross simplification 
termed "neutralism". I believe that my 
portrayal of the causes, the content and 
scope of these movements has helped 
this problem to be seen in the right 
proportions. 
Everyone I talked to in Washington 
asked me about future developments in 
France. President Reagan and I 
concurred in our determination to work 
together with President Mitterrand very 
closely. When it became known that I 
would stop over in Paris on my return 
flight for a meeting with President Mitter-
rand, this was at once expressly 
approved in Washington. 
"Wouldn't you two rather play?" 
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Discussion with Brezhnew 
East-West relations constitute a central 
issue of foreign policy for the German 
and U.S. Governments. Both Govern-
ments share the concern about the 
continuing arms build-up of the Soviet 
Union and its expansionist conduct, for 
instance in Afghanistan, Southern 
Yemen or Ethiopia. We both drew the 
conclusion that, in order to counter this 
and other challenges posed by the 
Soviet Union and to safeguard peace, 
we shall react with firmness while at the 
same time maintaining the dialogue with 
the Soviet Union. We are agreed that 
both these elements are indispensable. 
As part of this policy of maintaining a 
dialogue, I welcomed the fact that Presi-
dent Reagan has established personal 
contact with General Secretary Brezh-
nev and that Secretary of State Haig has 
already had a number of talks with the 
Soviet Ambassador in Washington. In 
this connection, I presented my views on 
the working visit which I have invited 
General Secretary Brezhnev to make to 
Bonn during the second half of this year. 
We were in agreement about the import-
ance attaching to a balanced result of 
the CSCE review conference in Madrid 
for the stabilization of East-West rela-
tions. On the other hand, both sides real-
SZ-Zcichnung: E. M. Lang 
ized that if developments occurred in or 
around Poland which cannot be desired 
by anyone, this would have the most 
serious repercussions on the policy of 
maintaining a dialogue. 
I had an exchange of views on basic 
aspects of our security with President 
Reagan, the Vice-President, the Secre-
tary of State and the Defense Secretary. 
We were agreed that the members of the 
Alliance must do everything necessary 
to counter the adverse effects on the 
military equilibrium caused by the 
conduct of the Soviet Union. I expressed 
my appreciation of the large and growing 
contribution made by the United States 
to Western defence. This also gave me 
an opportunity of describing the indis-
pensable contribution rendered by the 
Federal Republic of Germany to West-
ern security and peaceful world devel-
opments: a contribution made by our 
Bundeswehr, which is first-rate in terms 
of both quantity and quality, and another 
contribution we are making, inter alia, by 
our assistance to Alliance members. I 
am gratified to report that the U.S. Presi-
dent in particular was impressed by our 
defence contribution. No criticism was 
voiced. 
The American side reaffirmed that it 
shares our view that arms control and 
disarmament are integral parts of Alli-
ance security policy. This applies to the 
entire range of weapons: strategic, 
nuclear medium-range and conventional 
arms. With great seriousness and deter-
mination the President expressed his 
insistence on arms limitation negotia-
tions. 
U.S. Readiness to Negotiate 
As one particular aspect of our common 
security, we discussed the growing 
threat posed by Soviet Euro-strategic 
nuclear weapons. The framework for 
this discussion was set by the commu-
niques issued at this year's meetings of 
Foreign and Defence Ministers: We 
agreed on the need to adhere to both 
elements of the two-track decision, 
namely modernization and the offer of 
negotiations. 
The willingness of the United States to 
negotiate, which has been called into 
question by some people in Europe and 
by Soviet propaganda as well, was reaf-
firmed in the face of all scepticism: 
For instance by the fact that in the Joint 
Statement the U.S. Government offi-
cially states that Secretary of State Haig 
has already initiated preparatory 
discussions with the Soviet Union on 
nuclear medium-range weapons. And 
for example by the fact that in the Joint 
Statement President Reagan specifies 
that it is not negotiations as such that 
are important but negotiations leading to 
concrete results. 
I know that the United States is currently 
carefully preparing itself for these nego-
tiations. We shall be consulted in this 
matter, also in the further course of this 
process. I am convinced that the U.S. 
intends to negotiate swiftly and purpos-
ively. Anyone who is familiar with the 
history of arms control efforts and with 
the complex problems of nuclear 
medium-range weapons knows that 
these negotiations will be difficult and 
protracted. The decisive factor will be 
whether the Soviet Union, which has 
achieved particularly great actual su-
periority in this field, is prepared to nego-
tiate in a constructive manner. 
North-South Matters 
In the field of Third-World policy, too, it 
was my concern to get to know the 
motives and substance of American 
policy and to bring our views into 
harmony or approximate them as far as 
possible. Here, too, the ground had been 
prepared by the Foreign Ministers in 
Rome. 
The President and I agreed that genuine 
non-alignment of Third-World countries 
is an important factor for stability in 
international relations. We intend to 
continue our support for the indepen-
dence of Third-World States on the 
basis of equality and partnership. 
We share the view that this is the best 
strategy for counteracting the Soviet 
Union's direct and indirect attempts at 
expanding its political influence and 
power to those countries. 
In an intensive exchange of views on 
crisis areas in the Third World we 
concurred in the view that the Middle 
East conflict destabilizes the entire 
region and affords the Soviet Union 
additional openings for bringing its influ-
ence to bear on that area. We therefore 
agreed that both the United States and 
the European Community must 
energetically continue their efforts to 
achieve a comprehensive, just and last-
ing peace settlement in the Middle East. 
The European and the American efforts 
to bring about a settlement of the Middle 
East conflict should continue to be 
complementary. 
With regard to the endeavours to 
accomplish a peaceful and internation-
ally accepted Namibia settlement, the 
visit to Washington by Foreign Minister 
Both a of . South Africa constituted an 
important stage. I gained the strong 
impression in Washington that the new 
Administration is applying great en-
ergies to finding a Namibia solution and 
is making this clear to South Africa as 
well. The communique issued by the five 
Foreign Ministers in Rome (4 May 1981) 
and the corresponding United Nations 
resolutions will be, and will have to be, 
the foundation for a negotiated solution. 
We shall consider, together with our 
partners, that is, the United States, 
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, 
what additional confidence-building 
elements could be created. This applies 
in particular to the basic features a 
future constitutional order of an inde-
pendent Namibia should have. 
Fundamental agreement was also 
apparent in our considerations on new 
approaches to stabilizing the economies 
of the ·Central American/Caribbean 
region. We shared the view that improv-
ing the social and economic conditions 
in that region is a prerequisite for its pol-
itical stabilization. I therefore welcome 
the American considerations for a Carib-
bean-Central American development 
plan aimed at co-operation on the basis 
of partnership with the States of that 
region in order to promote their social 
and economic development. It is our 
view that such a plan should also 
embrace the oil producers Mexico and 
Venezuela. They could help their neigh-
bours by means of low-cost oil supplies 
to place the development plan on a 
sound economic basis. Such co-oper-
ation could serve as an example for the 
OPEC countries as a whole. It would 
strengthen the non-aligned status of the 
Central American and Caribbean coun-
tries and counteract Communist subver-
sion. 1 
Economic Summit in Ottawa 
A great deal of attention was given to 
questions of economic and energy 
policy. Both sides were conducting their 
exchange of views in the light of the 
summit meeting of the big industrial 
democracies to be held in Ottawa in 
July. 
Both Governments are determined to 
strengthen the open system of world 
trade and to oppose pressure for protec-
tionist measures. In this context I 
expressed my concern about the U.S.-
Japanese agreements to limit auto-
mobile exports to the United States. 
I explained to the American representa-
tives the aim of German energy policy to 
diversify as far as possible our depen-
dence on other countries for various 
forms of energy and their geographical 
origin, and the way in which we are trying 
to achieve this. The Joint Statement 
explicitly states that world-wide co-
operative efforts are necessary to 
master the pressing energy problems. 
The broad explanatory comments made 
by both sides on their economic policies 
met with great mutual interest. I called 
attention to the implications of U.S. 
economic, financial and monetary poli-
cies for the other national economies 
and the world economy, it was notice-
able in Washington that business and 
industry in the United States are placing 
great hopes in the new Administration. 
We have every reason to hope that the 
economic upswing in the United States 
will materialize soon as desired, since it 
would provide new positive impulses for 
the world economy. 
But I also voiced our concern over the 
consequences of the high level of U.S. 
interest rates for the European econ-
omy. We agreed that there must be a 
close co-ordination of economic policies 
among the industrialized countries. This 
will be one of the main topics for discus-
sion at the Ottawa meeting. 
I believe that President Reagan and I 
have fully achieved the aims envisaged 
for our meeting. 
We have come to know each other 
better and established a cordial 
personal relationship. This will benefit 
bilateral relations as well as our co-
operation in the multilateral, in the inter-
national sphere. We have reaffirmed the 
core of our Alliance policy, and we have 
defined problems and marked out ways 
of solving them in fields in which new 
departures have to be sought and tried 
out. The ground has been prepared for 
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close co-operation- a co-operation that 
will be of particular mutual benefit at this 
early stage of a new Administration, and 
which is irreplaceable and indispens-
able in the present critical world situ-
ation. 
I have returned from Washington with 
the deep impression that American self-
confidence has grown and that there is 
a new faith in the potential of that great 
country. President Reagan is deter-
mined to assume the role of American 
leadership in the world. 
Gennan-French Agreement 
My stopover in Paris gave French Presi-
dent Franoois Mitterrand and me a 
welcome opportunity for a first ex-
change of views after his instalment as 
President. I was very pleased to have 
this opportunity, and I was satisfied by 
the substance and tone of our meeting. 
We were in agreement that German-
French co-operation must be further 
consolidated and developed; it is of vital 
importance to the continuity and calcu-
lability of Western policy, to Europe's 
position in the world and to the future of 
both of our peoples. 
In our three and a half hours of talks, 
building on earlier conversations, Presi-
dent Mitterrand and I were able to reaf-
firm German-French agreement on all 
important international issues. I con-
veyed to the President greetings from 
President Reagan and, of course, 
informed him thoroughly concerning my 
talks in Washington. 
Our complete agreement in questions of 
Alliance policy and East-West affairs 
was of essential significance. Both of us 
are convinced that military balance must 
be maintained or, where it has shifted, 
re-established. France, too, although it 
is not directly involved, supports the 
implementation of both parts of the two-
track decision. 
Given a state of balance, the French, 
just as we ourselves, will continue the 
dialogue and co-operation with the 
Soviet Union and the East as a whole. 
As regards the policy vis-a-vis the Third 
World, a matter about which President 
Mitterrand is especially concerned, we 
are both striving for co-operation as 
partners with the developing countries. 
That co-operation is based on respect 
for Third World nations' sovereignty and 
non-alignment, which are indispensable 
conditions for world peace. 
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We discussed a number of current world 
problems and co-ordinated our assess-
ments of and positions on them. They 
included problems in the Near and 
Middle East, the critical situation in 
Lebanon, our co-operation with Saudi 
Arabia and the nations of the Gulf 
Region, problems in Southern Africa and 
the situation in Central America and the 
Caribbean. 
France is and remains our most import-
ant trading partner and indeed our most 
important partner in the economic 
sphere as a whole. We had a thorough 
discussion of world economic questions 
as well as bilateral economic relations 
between our countries. I was impressed 
by the determination of the President 
and his Government to defend the 
franc's stability. Both of us want to do 
our part to keep the European Monetary 
System (EMS) intact; it has an important 
stabilizing function, particularly in the 
current situation, for the other European 
economies as well as our own. 
We shared our concern about the 
effects of high interest rates in the 
United States on the European partners 
and want to help prevent an economic 
divergence between the U.S. and 
Europe. 
As regards European policy, President 
Mitterrand, in spite of the French elec-
tions next month, does not intend to 
suggest that the next meeting of the 
European Council on 29 and 30 June in 
Luxembourg be postponed. He, too, 
would like to make use of the first talks 
between the heads of Government to 
begin careful study of the Commission's 
expected proposals concerning an 
adjustment of financial structures and 
the reform of agricultural policy; this 
study, as we both see it, should lead to 
concrete resolutions by the time the 
European Council meets next at the end 
of November. 
Calculability of Foreign Policy 
All of the questions we touched on in this 
first exchange of views must now be 
gone into in more depth, and we have 
both asked the members of our Govern-
ments to establish the contact and close 
direct co-operation that have long been 
the rule in German-French relations. We 
have agreed to hold the next German-
French consultations in Bonn this July. 
President Mitterrand and I are interested 
in co-ordinating our positions before the 
beginning of the World Economic 
Summit in Ottawa on 20 July. 
To sum up, the meeting with President 
Mitt errand such a short time after he has 
taken office was politically important as 
well as encouraging. Both of us are 
convinced that German-French co-
operation will continue to prove itself in 
the difficult years ahead. 
My visits to Washington and Paris have 
shown that the change of heads of 
Government, a completely normal 
occurrence in a democracy, has not 
impaired our partnership with either the 
United States or France. The community 
of interest which has developed 
throughout the decades, the agreement 
on basic values which is of such decis-
ive importance to our nations and, parti-
cularly, the friendship and attachment 
between our peoples are so strong that 
changes of parties or individual persons 
in our Governments can hardly affect 
them. 
In the policy statement of 24 November 
1980 I said that we must not overesti-
mate our German role in world affairs nor 
let others do so. This remains valid. 
I returned from both visits with the firm 
conviction that the stability and calcu-
lability of this Federal Government's 
foreign policy are indispensable for our 
partners in the East, for the coherence of 
the Western Alliance and for peace in an 
increasingly instable and insecure 
world. 
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The 
Chancellor 
for the Record 
Helmut Schmidt, in interviews with 
mass media in Germany and 
abroad In 1981, on German-Amer-
ican relations. 
"Ante nne Deux" 
- French television 
January 19, 1981 
(f) The new U.S. President, Ronald 
Reagan, begins his term the day after 
tomorrow-and you, Mr. Chancellor, are 
the only foreign statesman to have met 
with him up to now. How would you rate 
him as a human being? What is your 
impression of Mr. Reagan? 
e ... Actually, I know the new Amer-
Ican President, Mr. Reagan, as the 
result of several meetings- three, alto-
gether-although there are surely quite 
a lot of European political leaders who 
have met him. I think there are good 
prospects for good co-operation 
between the United States of America 
and the countries of Western Europe. 
(f) On what do you base this confi-
dence? 
e As I said, on our face-to-face meet-
Ings in the past. 
(f) Naturally in America there is a new 
attitude, a changed purpose. Do you 
anticipate a worsening of the situation in 
regard to detente with the Soviet Union? 
Do you foresee a threat to peace-and in 
what way? 
e Throughout my political lifetime, I 
have always considered detente to be 
possible and realizable only on the 
basis of an equilibrium of forces. The 
new American Administration seems, 
as far as we know up to now, to take the 
view that In some military areas or In 
some regions of the world the balance 
of forces Is disturbed or perhaps en-
dangered; and the new U.S. Govern-
ment accordingly will try to restore the 
equilibrium everywhere. In Itself, that Is 
not a dangerous Intent. It would be 
dangerous if It were to be misunder-
stood ... 
@ ... You are for the basing of Pershing 
rockets in Europe - and rather fast? 
e Not faster than we jointly agreed 
upon In NATO. We here In Bonn contri-
buted to the reaching of this decision.Jt 
contains, indeed, another essential 
element: that is, the invitation to the 
Soviet Union to enter Into negotiations 
on a limitation of the number of these 
weapons. The negotiations were begun 
last autumn, and I hope they will be 
continued-continued successfully. 
@ You are well-acquainted with the 
problem of defense, and you know that 
there is a big debate as to whether the 
Soviet Union currently has a decisive mili-
tary lead. Do you think the U.S.S.R. is now 
militarily in the lead? ' 
e I don't believe the Soviet Union has 
an over-all lead, but I think there are 
problematic areas. One of these I've 
already mentioned: the medium-range 
weapons In Europe. There are a 
number of experts in America that see 
a second problematic area In the long-
range strategic weapons. That matter I 
can't judge so well, since Germany has 
no part at all of this military sphere. 
What Is apparent Is that Soviet military 
advisers, and Cuban troops allied with 
the U.S.S.R., are to be found here and 
there in the world where they actually 
don't belong. That needn't necessarily 
be In Itself a disturbance of the equilib-
rium-but it certainly Is a delicate 
psychological disturbance, at least a 
political disturbance. So I think your 
question cannot be answered gener-
ally; it has to be considered individually 
from region to region, from category to 
category. 
@ In France there are critics who think 
there has been, for example, no reaction 
to what is called the Soviet aspiration to 
domination; and the Americans have 
frequently complained about France and 
about Germany in this regard. 
e I think those who have complained 
have not done so for good reason. 
France and Germany, for example, 
have, for the defense of Europe, 
compulsory military service. Every 
young man in France, every young man 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
must put in service-and that isn't so in 
all the NATO states. It seems to me that 
Frarice and Germany have done the 
right thing. 
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"Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger" 
(Cologne) 
February 18, 1981 
@ You have said in the Bundestag that 
you could live with a formulation of the 
new American Administration's military 
policy reflected in the phrase "second to 
none", but not ... 
e Because such a phrasing Is recon-
cilable with the principle of equilibrium. 
"Second to none" after all means: not 
to be subordinate to anyone, not to be 
less strong than the other. 
@You said at the same time, and so it 
reads, too, in the communique of your visit 
with French President Giscard d'Estaing: 
but no superiority in any way. 
eYes, right. 
@ Last week it became known that 
President Reagan wants to increase the 
budget items for defense once more. That 
would, according to the new allotment, 
come to 225,000 million dollars for 1982, 
and would mean in increase over 1981 of 
a good 23 per cent. Are those develop-
ments efforts, first that justify the opinion 
that the issue in the U.S., other than what 
Reagan said in the election campaign, is 
only that of equilibrium? Second, are 
these efforts something with which we 
can keep up? 
e We're not asked to keep up at all. 
We have no cause for intruding and 
intervening. We're also not being asked 
to take part In domestic American 
discussions of defense questions, 
discussions that are being carried on 
over there astonishingly publicly. We 
don't need to speak up. The greatest 
imbalance between East and West 
exists in regard to the number of sol-
diers. That tends to be overlooked in 
America. The truth Is that you can't 
carry on war with money-you can only 
defend yourself with soldiers. 
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"Les Echos" (Paris) 
February 25, 1981 
@Does a strong America mean a good 
thing for or a threat to teamwork and an 
influential position for Europe? 
e The United States has promoted 
the process of European unification 
since Its beginnings. There Is no reason 
to assume that this traditional Ameri-
can position will change. Western 
Europe and the United States are 
dependent on good co-operation. That 
is why a clear and calculable policy on 
this side and that side of the Atlantic is 
necessary. Numerous problems-for 
example, in the economic and mone-
tary areas-will be simpler to solve with 
a strong America, capable of acting. 
The political co-operation among the 
member-countries of the European 
Community has resulted in their foreign 
policy's already being closely co-ordi-
nated in important and extensive 
sectors. The closer this intra-European 
co-operation is and the more the Euro-
peans agree as to their foreign policy, 
the better can they bring their influence 
to bear at the global level .. 
"Deutschlandfunk" 
March 8, 1981 
@Now there is the fear that the Reagan 
Administration in America actually is 
aspiring, not to balance but to superiority. 
One also comes upon this fear in the 
ranks of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD). How can the fear be done away 
with? 
e I believe such fears are unjustified. 
I cannot do away with them; I'm not the 
new American Administration's public-
relations director. The U.S. Govern-
ment Itself will do away with the fears. 
I've no doubt about that. And in fact that 
Is bound to happen. At the moment at 
which the new American Government 
under President Reagan begins nego-
tiations with the Soviet leadership, it 
will become evident that Washington Is 
not negotiating with the purpose of 
having the Russians confirm a U.S. 
superiority, or to safeguard such supe-
riority in a treaty. Instead, it will 
become clear to all that the United 
States is negotiating to establish equi-
librium. But it will also emergf!Het me 
repeat-that It will not be so simple to 
determine how a balance between the 
United States of America and the 
Soviet Union actually has to look. 
@ Secretary-General Brezhnev, in his 
speech to the party congress in Moscow, 
proposed to President Reagan a summit 
for two. And the President wants first to 
get the views on this proposal of his most 
important alliance partners-thus, for 
instance, views from you; partners of 
whom some are, as he said, only a bus 
ride away from the Soviet military power. 
Will you advise President Reagan to 
agree? 
e That I shall most certainly do. 
Anyhow. as I see it the most important 
point in Leonid Brezhnev's party-
congress speech is that on his own he 
is offering the United States of America 
negotiations. He is practically seeking 
such negotiations. And I know from 
Ronald Reagan, from a talk shortly 
after his election but before his taking 
office in Washington, that he is 
prepared to negotiate with the Soviet 
Union, especially about armament limi-
tation. On that occasion he said, in a 
sentence: We are prepared to nego-
tiate-that means, to do so very emphati-
cally and with a great outlay of time 
and patience. Surely President Reagan 
won't be an easy negotiating partner, 
one to hoodwink-thank God, he won't 
be. For that matter, the Russians are 
also not easy negotiating partners. 
(cont. on page 16) 
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Cabinet-level 
Consultations: 
German Guests in 
Washington during the 
Reagan Government's 
First 100 Days 
March 11, 1981: Foreign Minister Hans-Diet-
rich Genscher (1.) consults with the head of 
the State Department, Alexander Haig. 
March 24, 1981: Defense Minister Hans 
'' Apel (r.) calls on his American counterpart, 
Caspar Weinberger. 
March 18, 1981: Minister of Economics Otto 
Count L.ambsdorff (1.) and U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury Donald Regan confer. 
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@ There is grave concern that the arma-
. ment escalation is going ahead 
unchecked. Do you see tangible chances 
for an understanding about armament 
control? 
eves, absolutely. Although much 
has been said about this since the end 
of the last world war, it has certainly 
taken very long until treaties on equilib-
rium in the field of armament actually 
came into existence. Shortly after the 
Cuba crisis, which almost led to a third 
world war, the two superpowers, 
emerging from this shock, brought into 
being a treaty in which they obliged 
themselves not to explode experimen-
tally any more nuclear bombs above 
the earth's surface. Both powers 
proceeded, apparently, from the 
premise that neither has a lead. After 
that came the atomic non-proliferation 
treaty. These were treaties as to an 
equilibrium, treaties in which many 
states have not, however, participated. 
SALT I in particular proceeds from the 
premise of equilibrium. In addition, 
there is the conception, aspired to by 
·the West as by the East, of a treaty, 
being negotiated in Vienna, on limiting 
conventional armament in Europe 
(MBFR). There is also SALT II. And 
there are the Geneva negotiations on 
limiting so-called Euro-strategic 
weapons, talks that got started, with 
considerable initial German help, last 
autumn. Mention should also be made 
of the current Madrid negotiations 
about a mandate for a still-to-be-called 
conference on European disarmament. 
This conference is, aniong other things, 
to establish identical military visibility 
in Western and in Eastern Europe-from 
the Atlantic to the Urals-through so-
called confidence-building measures. 
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"Berliner Morgenpost" 
April 4, 1981 
@ The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany remains firmly at the 
side of its principal ally, the United States 
of America. On the one hand, how broad 
is the leeway for Western Europe to intro-
duce its own experiences with the East-
West relationship into the new American 
foreign policy-without on the other hand, 
becoming suspected of succumbing to 
attempts by Moscow to divide the Euro-
pean partners and Washington? 
e I don't see that the change of 
Government in Washington has altered 
the leeway of the European countries in 
regard to foreign or security policy; the 
change in Washington certainly hasn't 
narrowed this leeway. On the contrary, 
one cannot overlook with what 
personal commitment and intensity 
President Reagan and Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig repeatedly speak 
up for close consultations with their 
allies ... If the talk Is about a narrowing 
of the leeway to negotiate, that could 
only result from a worsening of the 
East-West relationship, not of the rela-
tionship of individual countries of the 




April 7, 1981 
@ For you, surely, the most important 
aspect is the dispute as to the necessity of 
the NATO "two-track" decision-that is, on 
the one hand the basing of new American 
medium-range weapons in Europe, and 
on the other hand the attempt, in negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union in this area as 
well, to arrive at an agreement on the limi-
tation of this arms race. Do you see, within 
and outside the SPD, parallels with the 
anti-atomic-weapons campaign in the 
1950s? 
e One can see such parallels if one 
wants to. As far as the German Federal 
Government and the Social Democratic 
faction in the Bundestag are 
concerned, I have no doubt at all that 
the decision will be supported as it was 
taken, in both its parts. It is the agreed 
intention of the North Atlantic Alliance 
to achieve negotiations between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of 
America-to achieve a limitation, a 
numerical limitation, of nuclear 
medium-range weapons on both sides. 
The decision was not taken in order to 
calm troubled souls, but because it is 
urgently necessary to limit the total of 
weapons on both sides. Negotiations 
about this can only be carried out 
successfully if the Soviet leadership 
sees that it cannot maintain the fantas-
tic lead that its arming has gained for 
it-because the West is in a position to 
modernize its own armament. The 
intention to upgrade NATO's armament 
must be serious, and on both sides of 
the negotiating table it must be 
appraised as being seriously intended. 
Then we shall get to serious negotia-
tions-and also to a mutual numerical 
limitation. And I have no doubt at all 
that the Social Democratic Bundestag 
faction, no more than the Government, 
will not give up this conviction. All 
these treaties and negotiations 
proceed from the concept of equilib-
rium. However, we have had only two 
decades of experience in negotiations 
in this area-that is not much. 
@ But what has come of it up to now is 
not much, either. 
e To some, the results to date in 
regard to the nuclear threat may seem 
completely insufficient. I should like 
not to be quite so critical, and should 
like to appreciate the fact that an actual 
start has been made. I am putting all the 
force of the Federal Republic of 
Germany's support into helping to see 
to it that further progress is made in 
this sphere. But I should like to add that 
up to now no such treaty has resulted in 
one of the participating superpowers' 
having a feeling of hopeless inferiority. 
+ background information material + + + background informatiori material + 
Second German Television 
(ZDF) 
April 9, 1981 
@ ... The Americans tell anyone who 
will listen that they want to upgrade their 
armament first and then negotiate-while 
in Europe the idea is that negotiations and 
upgrading of armament should proceed 
simultaneously at least. Here then there is 
a clear difference. Why isn't that admit-
ted? 
e There Isn't this difference, as far as 
the American President, the 
U.S. Secretary of State and the Euro-
pean heads of Government and Euro-
pean foreign ministers are concerned. 
It is true that there are other Americans, 
who are not in elective offices, who 
give interviews on the side and influ-
ence the media. But I have no doubt at 
all that this year the negotiations 
between the Americans and the 
Russians about these famous medium-
range weapons will be continued-no 
doubt at all. That is the shared desire of 
all the European partners, and it is also 
the wish of the American President. I 
myself heard from him that he will 
negotiate and negotiate and nego-
tiate ... If the ideal is said to be that the 
Americans and the Europeans should 
be in 100 % agreement on all military 
questions, I disagree, for I can't 
consider that an ideal. Instead, I 
know-for 25 years I have concerned 
myself in the Bundestag with security 
and defense policy, and with the alli-
ance and our partners-! know that in 
these 25 years there have been many 
differences. One of the worst was 
between ex-Chancellor Adenauer and 
former President Eisenhower-in the 
1 950s, about the so-called Redford 
Plan. The next big difference came at 
the beginning of the 1960s, over the 
proposal for the so-called Multilateral 
Force-an American proposal. And so 
there were repeated differences, in 
part major ones. Then people-whether 
in America or in Europe-would write 
"NATO Is a crisis." Well, I have exper-
Ienced that year after year.lt's also this 
way with "SPD in a crisis". You read 
that too every year. And nevertheless 
the alliance has been very effec-
tive-exactly as the Social Democratic 
Party is very effective. One dare not 
pay too much attention to these things. 
Fortune (New York) 
April 20, 1981 
@ What worries you most about the 
U.S. elephant right now? 
e If the Fed alone must fight the 
battle against inflation in America, it 
must continue to resort to extremely 
high interest rates that distort and 
upset the world's exchange rates. 
Constantly swinging Interest rates are 
bad for trade and stability. On the other 
hand, if the Reagan Administration Is 
able to cut budgetary expenditures as 
quickly as it plans to cut taxes, inflatio-
nary pressures would be eased and the 
Fed would no longer be forced to keep 
rates so high. 
@How do you view the global economic 
situation at present? 
e The world is in a double 
crisis-involving both structural prob-
lems and business cycles. In a situation 
of growing unemployment in Europe 
and North America and growing hunger 
and famine in nearly all the developing 
countries, there are inevitably growing 
pressures for taking self-centered 
measures. I am deeply convinced that 
the economic summits have served a 
very important purpose: to avoid 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies. I would 
like to add a footnote: it took a great 
many meetings before the seven lead-
ing industrial powers became 
convinced that no economic disease 
can be cured by printing money. In that 
sense, the world is much better-
educated now than in 1974. 
@ As you know, many Americans are 
worried that West Germany might become 
overly dependent upon the Soviet Union if 
the Russians had their hand on the gas 
tap. 
e We use much less natural gas than 
you do in your economy. For many 
years, we have set a figure, which I will 
not disclose, of how much energy we 
allow ourselves to draw from any coun-
try. We are well within those limits and 
we intend to remain so. 
German Television (ARD) 
May 7, 1981 
@ Mr. Chancellor, you always speak of 
military equilibrium, as being vital for the 
Federal Republic of Germany's security. 
But your critics allege that with you and, 
above all, with the Americans, the demand 
for equilibrium is basically only an alibi. In 
reality, they say, you want military superi-
ority; you want for the West, spurred, so to 
speak, by the Reagan Administration, to 
regain what it has lost in the years of 
detente policy-namely, military superior-
ity. 
e Anyone who aspires to military 
superiority could not have my appro-
val. That is also the view of, for exam-
ple, the French Government, to 
mention only one. But just this week, 
within the whole alliance, meeting in 
Rome, we have found a very broad 
agreement on the principle of over-all 
equilibrium, if possible at a lower level 
of the totals of armed forces and of 
their equipment. Anyone who throws 
the principle of equilibrium overboard 
at the same time courts numerous 
dangers. He runs the risk that one side 
will become superior and the other 
inferior-with the latter finally having, in 
critical situations, to bow to the pres-
sure, the threat of the superior side. 
And, especially, he courts the danger 
that there can be no'disarmament trea-
ties at all, no arms-limitation treaties at 
all, either in regard to nuclear weapons 
or concerning conventional weapons. 
For all such treaties are after all only 
conceivable on the basis of the princi-
ple that there will be agreement on the 
same security, the same military 
weight-approximately Identical 
weight-on both sides. Naturally this 
equal military weight need not be 
measured down to the last ounce; 
needn't be identical down to decimal 
points. Whoever considers equilibrium 
just a fine word, and waves it aside, 
surrenders the Idea of mutual absten-
tion from armament, agreed to under 
international law-a mutual limitation of 
arms-even if the critic of equilibrium is 
not aware of this consequence. 
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Second Gennan Television 
(ZDF) 
May 17, 1981 
(l) The United States expects us to 
make increased efforts in the area of 
security policy. In turn, we have certain 
politico-economic concerns-especially 
monetary concerns-in regard to the U.S. 
The clearest example here is the differ-
ence in interest rate. Will you be making 
demands of America in this area? 
e "Demands" Is too emphatic a word. 
Certainly In our preparations for the 
summit of the seven big Industrial 
democracies, the meeting to take place 
In Ottawa In July-In preparation for 
that, we shall be talking about world 
monetary policy, Including interest 
policy. Not only the Federal Republic of 
Germany, after all, other European 
countries too are suffering because of 
the very high interest. That will 
certainly be a topic of our talks. Incid-
entally, I don't see that this has 
anything to do with security matters. 
But it can be that the Americans abso-
lutely understand our concerns, with-
out being able to accommodate us. We 
shall need to feel our way in this situa-
tion. Nor will the matter be cleared up 
on a single visit. It Is essentially a 
matter for the finance ministers, later; 




We Want To 





From a Joint Statement by the 
President of the French Republic 
and the Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the occa-
sion of the Franco-German consul-
tations in Paris on February 5 and 
6, 1981 
The President of the French Republic 
and the Chancellor of the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany have reviewed the 
deteriorated international situation in 
depth and considered what efforts are 
necessary for its rehabilitation. 
They intend to counter the facts which 
have led to this destabilization and the 
ensuing dangers to peace with the joint 
and determined action of the two coun-
tries. 
To this end they express their determin-
ation to co-operate with the new U.S. 
Administration on a basis of mutual 
trust. 
They intend to gain recognition for three 
requirements on which the stabilization 
of East-West relations and the preser-
vation of peace depend. 
The first concerns the balance of secur-
ity. It precludes the acceptance of a 
position of weakness just as much as 
the aspiration to military superiority. It 
starts from the assumption that the 
efforts to achieve arms limitation and 
reduction take into account the principle 
of a global balance of power. It requires 
alertness and dialogue in equal 
measure. 
The Federal Republic of Germany and 
France are helping to guarantee the 
balance of security by reaffirming their 
adherence to the obligations of the 
Atlantic Alliance, by declaring their 
determination to maintain their defense 
efforts devolving upon them by virtue of 
their membership of the Alliance, and by 
advocating a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe aimed at securing in a 
first. phase the adoption of confidence-
building measures to be applied from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. 
+ background information material + + + background information material + 
The second requirement is moderation 
in political action. Moderation has been 
. made a duty obtaining above all in rela-
. tions al)'long the signatories of the. Fif1al . 
Act of Helsinki, which has laid down the . 
rules for such action. It also means es-
sentially that Poland must be in a posi-
tion to resolve its serious problems 
alone and without interference from 
outside. 
Everywhere-both outside and inside 
Europe-moderation is incompatible with 
any recourse to force, with a policy of 
faits accomplis, and with any attempts 
to secure unilateral advantages. The 
Federal Republic of Germany and 
France refer to their statement of Febru-
ary 5, 1980, reaffirm their condemnation 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
and repeat that detente would not 
survive another blow of the same kind. 
In the light of crisis or conflict situations, 
the requirement of moderation must also 
lead to attempts to find political solu-
tions-that is to say, solutions which are 
negotiated with the participation of all 
interested parties. This is the purpose of 
the efforts made by the Europeans in the 
Middle East, of the Namibia initiative of 
the Five, and of France's proposal with 
regard to Afghanistan. This is also the 
purpose of the support which the 
Federal Republic of Germany and 
France are giving to the Lagos/Lome 
agreement concerning the indepen-
dence of Chad. 
The third requirement concerns the 
equality of responsibility vis-a-vis major 
international problems. The fight against 
hunger, poverty and underdevelopment, 
the restoration of monetary and econ-
omic stability by means of a more 
moderate oil price policy, as well as the 
use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful 
purposes, are universal challenges. 
These objectives can only be achieved if 
the independence and self-reliance of 
the states and peoples of the Third 
World are respected and their desire for 
genuine non-alignment recognized. It is 
necessary that in the field of economic 
aid all countries of the world, irrespec-
tive of their political system, render an 
appropriate contribution to the esta-
blishment of an international order in 
which all nations will see their security, 
their prospects of progress, and respect 
for their dignity and freedom guaranteed. 
In defining these objectives, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and France are 
aware of Europe's responsibilities. They 
are resolved to take those responsibili-
ties upon themselves in solidarity with 
their eight partners ... 
The solution of the present problems in 
the European Community, the streng-
thening of Europe's political cohesion, 
the safeguarding of economic stability 
and economic progress, are tasks of 
prime importance which must be fulfilled 
so that Europe may resume the role that 
corresponds to its historical tradition. 
On the occasion of the German-French consultations on Febraury 5 and 6, 1981, in Paris, a 
discussion that included a planned further expansion of cultural relations, Chancellor Schmidt 
receives an honorary doctorate from the Sorbonne. The university's President Raymond Polin 
confers the degree. 
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Chancellor Schmidt after his 
visit to Paris on his return trip 
from the U.S. 
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Statement on German Television, 
Channel 1 (May 24, 1981} 
There will certainly be continuity (in 
German-French relations); incidentally, 
I had a feeling to that effect even before 
I came here to Paris. I already knew 
M. Mitterrand very well from previous 
meetings. And I do know this above all: 
that among the French people and the 
German people the awareness of being 
dependent on each other- of wanting to 
live together in friendship - is so strong 
that, independently of political parties 
and personalities, German-French co-
operation is deeply rooted. 
Interview With German Tele-
vision, Channel 2 ( May 24, 
1981) 
Question: During this first discus-
sion with President Mitterrand, did you 
have the feeling that something is 
changing in the East-West relationship 
of the two big European countries -
especially in regard to the NATO "two-
track" decision (to prepare to base 
nuclear missiles in Western Europe, 
while offering the U.S.S.R. disarmament 
negotiations)? 
Answer: No, I don't have that feeling 
at all. On the contrary, I have a feeling of 
continuity. In any event, what we 
compared views about in regard to, for 
example, the NATO "two-track" deci-
sion, President Mitterrand and I, showed 
our full agreement. Our views were 
entirely along the same line. We both 
believe that the equilibrium was upset by 
the Soviet Union, via its SS-20 arma-
ment programme; that this balance must 
be restored; but we also believe that the 
dialogue with the Soviet Union must 
take place. 
Question: President Mitterrand 
again spoke of "privileged" (German-
French) relations. Will those extend to 
the economic sphere, too? 
Answer: I believe German-French 
relations will continue to be expanded in 
the future, and surely this development 
will also extend to the economic field -
and by no means only, let's say, within 
the European Community. 
On the return flight from Washington, Chancellor Schmidt confers with new French President 
Mitterrand. 
